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ABSTRACT
ELECTRIC POWER MARKET MODELING WITH
MULTI-AGENT REINFORCEMENT LEARNING
SEPTEMBER 2010
NATHANAEL K. MIKSIS, M.S., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Erin Baker

Agent-based modeling (ABM) is a relatively new tool for use in electric power market
research. At heart are software agents representing real-world stakeholders in the industry:
utilities, power producers, system operators, and regulators. Agents interact in an environment
modeled after the real-world market and underlying physical infrastructure of modern power
systems. Robust simulation laboratories will allow interested parties to stress test regulatory
changes with agents motivated and able to exploit any weaknesses, before making these changes
in the real world. Eventually ABM may help develop better understandings of electric market
economic dynamics, clarifying both delineations and practical implications of market power.
The research presented here builds upon work done in collateral fields of machine
learning and computational economics, as well as academic and industry literature on electric
power systems. We build a simplified transmission model with agents having learning
capabilities, in order to explore agent performance under several plausible scenarios. The model
omits significant features of modern electric power markets, but is able to demonstrate successful
convergence to stable profit-maximizing equilibria of adaptive agents competing in a quantitybased, available capacity model.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
This thesis reports on a research project to build an adaptive agent-based model (ABM)
and apply it to the restructured electric power industry. We use as a basis a learning algorithm
developed within the field of reinforcement learning (a cross-disciplinary field originating out of
computer science and machine learning) to model electric power generating companies in a
simplified multi-node transmission-constrained power system, similar in kind if not in scale to
real-world power systems (such as that operated by ISO New England Inc.). There are myriad
challenges ahead for researchers in this field, and these are detailed in this proposal. However,
equally as important is the potential value that robust and demonstrably-accurate simulation tools
hold for applications to electric power market modeling.
Early literature in the reinforcement learning field has already shown that optimality
proofs exist for agents engaged in online learning in a stationary environment (Sutton and Barto,
1998). The challenges of using online learning algorithms in non-stationary environments, of
which most electric power market models are examples, are described below 1 . In this paper, we
first provide an overview of the significant features of modern electricity markets that make
modeling research particularly valuable (Section 1.1). We then cover relevant contemporary
research being done on more realistic market models (including multi-node transmission systems
and more adaptive agents competing simultaneously in the same market) and some background
1

A stationary task is not necessarily deterministic, but one in which the effect of an action is a sample of a fixed
probability distribution. Through trial and error, a person or an agent can learn that the expected result of a coin flip
is 50% heads and 50% tails and will be correct in believing this distribution to be true, but many tasks involve
probability distributions that are not stationary. A task in which the effect of an action depends on the action taken
by another agent who is also learning through trial and error is one example.
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on agent-based modeling (Section 1.3 and Chapter 2). After that, we outline first the agent-based
electric power market model presented in Miksis, 2006, which was a predecessor to the current
model. Then we detail the new model in Section 3.3, which incorporates a 5-node transmission
model, with thermal line limits and congestion pricing (or locational marginal pricing) 2 . In
contrast to most contemporary research, and the model presented in Miksis, 2006, the agents in
the new model compete on quantity rather than price. 3
Because quantity-based competition has received less attention than price-based models
in the electric power ABM field, while market manipulation through physical withholding
remains a significant potential in existing competitive markets, we hope to demonstrate the
utility of this line of research in the field by answering several questions:
1. Can a community of adaptive agents competing in a quantity-based market model
achieve equilibrium under various initial conditions?
2. Can players with plants at multiple locations (on either side of a transmission
constraint) discover withholding policies that cause congestion, essentially raising
prices at the import-constrained node?
3. Does the market as a whole supply surplus capacity above load or is the average
excess capacity margin in equilibrium close to zero?

2

See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Electricity_market#Bid-based.2C_securityconstrained.2C_economic_dispatch_with_nodal_prices
3
Banal-Estanol and Micola, 2009, survey agent-based electricity market models and highlight the shortcomings of
price-based competition (Bertrand models). They mention that neither Bertrand nor Cournot (pure quantity-based)
models are ideally suited to electricity markets because real-world markets allow variable prices over tranches of
capacity. We have attempted to address this by modifying traditional quantity-based competition to introduce these
variably-priced tranches of capacity.

2

Several researchers have incorporated additional features of real world power markets
that we were unable to incorporate, but are possible as an extension to this work, such as
demand-side bidding and a multi-settlement (Day-Ahead and Balancing) market. Many pressing
questions about the effects of multi-settlement and elastic demand on market efficiency have real
world implications and modeling these features with adaptive agents could contribute to policy
discussions, particularly when assessment of costs-benefits of implementation is being
considered. The next section introduces in broad form modern electric power markets, some
history and some distinguishing features.
1.1. Primer on Electric Power Markets
Here we outline the salient features of modern restructured power systems that motivate
the research and provide an overview of recent modeling efforts. Several recent published works
provide excellent overviews on the most critical avenues of industry research as well as the stateof-the-art modeling and experiment efforts, including Conzelman, et al, 2004, Ventosa, et al,
2005, Weidlich and Veit, 2008, Nanduri and Das, 2009.
In the last couple of decades, restructuring in the electric power industry has
fundamentally changed the environment in which every interested party operates, from
regulators to system operators to generation and transmission owners to load-serving power
companies and consumers. One thing has become clear in the move toward a competitive
structure: Electricity is unlike any other commodity, and the existing economic and financial
models are largely inapplicable to the study of it (Bunn and Oliveira, 2001; Ventosa, et al, 2005;
Weidlich and Veit, 2008), while problems absent from or present only to limited degree in other

3

industries appear regularly in the electric power industry, such as price volatility and extreme
market power (Stoft, 2002).
A comprehensive introduction to the history and economic dynamics of restructured
power markets is beyond the scope of this paper (interested readers are referred to Stoft, 2002 or
Hunt, 2002). That said an overview of a sort is called for. The following features characterize
electric power markets:

1. Real-time load balancing (supply and demand must match at all times, while even
day-ahead load forecasting, like all forecasting, is subject to error; these errors can
have significant real-time market impacts; load balancing is also intimately
related to other factors affecting reliability, including voltage and frequency).
2. Undeveloped demand-side participation (while supply is at most times highly
elastic, demand is not) (Bunn and Martoccia, 2008).
3. Non-storability (economical large-scale storage technologies, other than pumped
storage hydro facilities, which are limited by topography, do not exist).
4. Physical fragility (thousands of interconnected physical components make
contingency analysis and very conservative contingency coverage, a crucial role
of system operators).

4

5. High market concentration (even after divestiture efforts, the generation sector
can still be considered a semi-competitive oligopoly with a competitive fringe;
Entriken and Wan, 2005; Somani and Tesfatsion, 2008) 4 .
6. High integration of multiple related markets (fuel markets, capacity and ancillary
services markets, bilateral contracting, as well as both day-ahead and real-time
energy markets; emissions markets are becoming increasingly relevant, too).
7. Temporal disconnect between investment decisions and revenue streams (with
extreme price volatility and uncertainty with regard to regulatory changes,
forecasting revenues to recover costs of a twenty, thirty or fifty year investment is
difficult).
8. Non-convexity of costs (total costs are characterized by extremely high fixed
investment costs and relatively low variable costs).
9. Mutable regulatory regimes.
These nine features combine to create an electric power sector that is complex and poorly
understood in terms of the economic dynamics, and motivate the development of novel
sophisticated modeling tools for operations (for system operators), policy-making (for
regulators), decision-support (for parties with vested interests in the industry) and academic
research (Amin, 2002; Czernohous, et al, 2003; Koritarov, 2004; Sun and Tesfatsion, 2007; Bunn
and Martoccia, 2008; Weidlich and Veit, 2008; Nanduri and Das, 2009). While the physical
4

A partial exception would be systems with large vertically integrated utilities, with generation as well as
transmission and distribution. In these cases, generation may still be concentrated, though a significant portion of
capacity will be controlled by entities without the profit-maximizing incentive of higher electricity prices.
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characteristics of power systems are generally well understood, the questions of efficiency and
social welfare that are raised by imperfect competition and market power as it is exacerbated by
the physical and economic complexity remain. Consequently, research into market behavior
under imperfect competition has generally become the focus of study du jour (Bunn and
Martoccia, 2008). Of particular interest is whether prices reflect what could be expected of a
fully competitive market (which we know electricity is not), and so robust, demonstrably
accurate simulation tools for benchmarking to real-world data are a particularly sought-after
goal.
To briefly summarize the physical operational challenges and how the nine characterizing
features outlined above interact, at all times supply must be balanced with demand (#1), as
electricity is still largely a non-storable commodity except at prohibitively high costs (#3), and
demand is highly inelastic (#2). Complicating the picture further is the fact that the power grid is
essentially a single large interconnected machine, with many thousands of moving parts,
dynamic constraints and almost uncountable potential sources of failure (contingencies, in
industry parlance), which, if unmitigated, can lead to cascading system failure (blackouts; #4).
Consequently, system operators spend significant amounts of time on contingency analysis (CA),
and operate the system with sufficient redundancy to be able to weather the first and second
largest contingencies (generator or transmission line trips) without risking systemic failure.
Additionally, real-time conditions (both forecast and not) can essentially create high market
concentration in a small area (or system-wide in the case of a heat wave or cold snap during
which real-time demand approaches system capacity), if transmission import capability is
reduced through contingency or planned outage (#4 + #5).

6

The long planning horizon and high fixed costs (#7 and #8) along with the uncertainty
and complexity that come from multiple interacting markets (#6), makes forecasting and
investment decisions challenging for market participants. Also, in the short history of industry
restructuring (Orders 888 and 889, accelerating nascent existing restructuring in the United
States, were passed by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission in 1996; formation of
Independent System Operators or ISOs followed in 1997), regulators and policy-makers have
shown a tendency to refine/tweak/enhance the markets, contributing to uncertainty for market
participants. For more on the continuing debates surrounding market structure, readers are
referred to (Hirst and Hadley, 1999; Besser, Farr and Tierney, 2002; Borenstein and Holland,
2002; Stoft, 2002; Joskow, 2003; De Vries and Heijnen, 2008).
As mentioned above, whether competitive markets achieve the goals set forth in the laws
governing electricity and natural gas markets (the Federal Power Act and subsequent enacted
laws) remains an open and contentious question. A consequence of this has been that significant
resources are regularly dedicated to refining market rules. Thus the lack of certain robust proofs
that competition in electricity leads necessarily to just and reasonable (a legal threshold
frequently cited) outcomes both motivates the study of modeling tools and complicates the
development of them.
Of special recent interest has been the development of what has been termed a “smart
grid.” According to a National Energy Technology Laboratory report on “the Modern Grid,” a
central component to a smart grid is advanced simulation capabilities to support system operator
training under dynamic conditions (NETL, 2007). In this context, the ability to simulate both the
learning and acting capabilities of all actors in a power system that is changing is critical to
enhance system operator situational awareness for greater reliability (U.S.-Canada Power System

7

Outage Task Force, 2005; Overbye and Wiegmann, 2005). This could be considered a second
parallel motivation, as robust simulation of economic dynamics becomes increasingly crucial
under changing industry conditions (distributed smart-grid technologies and automated
sophisticated protection systems throughout the transmission system).
1.2. Pressing Questions in Electric Power Market Regulation and Design
Increasingly, the question of whether current market designs provide the proper
incentives to ensure levels of investment needed for a reliable electricity system has surrounded
debates about the future of power systems under liberalized energy markets 5 . The novelty of
these debates is not surprising, as electricity was long considered a good that required high levels
of centralized coordination in both short and long-term decision-making in order to, as the saying
goes, “Keep the lights on.” It has long been understood that the electric power system is a
unique and especially delicate network requiring close constant attention and centralized
operation. Thus, the concept of reliability in industry literature has long been recognized.
However, responsibility for maintaining reliability was more clearly established and assigned
under the former paradigm of highly regulated, vertically-integrated utilities, and reliability was
ensured through investments in new and upgraded generation assets based on technical
calculations of loss of load probability (or LOLP), with remuneration for capacity investments
determined by state regulatory agencies (Viscusi et al, 2000).
In recent years, the question of whether market operation can indeed provide the right
incentives for maintaining sufficient levels of available electric power generating capacity has
5

Andrew Ford (2002), showed empirically and through computer simulation how electricity markets are prone to
boom-bust cycles similar to other commodity markets. This phenomenon is especially dangerous in electricity
simply because of the complexity and fragility of the system as a whole. When demand outstrips supply, the
integrity of the system can be compromised, price volatility notwithstanding.

8

come to the fore in industry trade journals, among academic researchers and industry participants
(Jaffe & Felder, 1996; Besser, Farr & Tierney, 2002; De Vries & Hakvoort, 2004; Baldick et al,
2005; Cramton & Stoft, 2005). There remains no consensus on the answer, and real world
experiences in market implementation vary significantly worldwide. Generally, proponents of
the position that a separate mechanism is needed to ensure adequacy maintain that electricity is a
commodity with particularities that prevent a pure spot market from simultaneously providing
enough revenue for producers and shielding consumers from extreme price volatility (Besser,
Farr and Tierney, 2002).
The question of how adequacy is defined is also a contentious issue, particularly with
regard to the fact that capacity adequacy in many other industries is not an issue of public
concern. Hirst and others have argued that adequacy should not be predetermined, but should be
discovered implicitly by market interactions (Hirst and Hadley, 1999; Rochlin, 2004). This
position holds that energy reserves, like energy itself, can be a private good. The argument goes
that electricity reserve, which is generation capacity that is available on very short notice, fails
the test of a public good. It can be bought and sold privately, if spot energy prices are allowed to
fluctuate unconstrained. If given the opportunity end-users who currently are not exposed to
time-of-use-based prices for electricity would begin to treat electricity like other consumption
commodities, and the efficiencies of the market model would improve today’s power systems.
Another position holds that the definition of resource adequacy really has not changed
qualitatively from the days of integrated and regulated monopolies. Those in this camp generally
maintain that reliability is a public good, one that the energy-only market will always underprovide. They highlight that while capacity and reserves are private goods, the extra service they
provide in the form of increased system security must be remunerated through another channel

9

beyond the energy spot market (Jaffe & Felder, 1996; Farr and Felder, 2005). A general rule of
thumb used in the United States is that put forward by the North American Electric Reliability
Council (NERC), which maintains that adequacy is defined as the level of capacity necessary to
ensure no more than one day of outages (lost or curtailed load) in ten years.
In some of the original literature on the subject of electricity markets, it was shown that a
model consisting of an energy-only spot market for electricity could provide sufficient incentives
for capacity investment and would result in both short and long term efficiency (Schweppe,
1978; Caramanis, 1982; Caramanis et al, 1982). Later work in the field built on this foundation
economic model and many today argue that a pure spot market can result in a socially optimal
outcome (Shuttleworth, 1997; Hirst and Hadley, 1999). Stoft (2002, 2003) maintains that while
the pure model could work with defined energy price caps, determining the proper cap is difficult
and setting it improperly could do more harm than no caps at all.
Many others have built upon this contention and concluded that, while the model would
work given the assumptions made, energy-only markets cannot adequately ensure capacity levels
necessary for system reliability due to certain fundamental characteristics of electric power
systems such as are discussed below (Jaffe and Felder, 1996; Besser, Farr and Tierney, 2002;
Bidwell and Henney, 2004; De Vries and Hakvoort, 2004; Cramton and Stoft, 2005). Some have
highlighted that the complexities surrounding liberalized markets in modern power systems
require that markets (for energy, ancillary services and capacity, where it is included) be
carefully designed in concert, while the real necessity of capacity mechanisms of any form is an
open question (Baldick et al, 2005). Jaffe and Felder (1996) propose that installed capacity
requirements contribute to reliability, by lowering the estimated loss of load probability (the
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likelihood that demand will not be met), and that this contribution cannot be reflected and valued
in the spot market.
The specific characteristics that are highlighted which can lead to market failure vary.
Baldick et al (2005) provide an overview of the particular characteristics of electricity markets
that make application of standard economic theory to market design difficult. They and others
mention that many of the assumptions made in consideration of economic models for power
markets cannot be realistically made. Jaffe and Felder put forward the idea that there exist
certain significant externalities to production and consumption of electricity that distort the
market’s operation; They argue that the spot energy market cannot reflect the changes to system
reliability that result from capacity investments and load changes, and thus those who lower
overall reliability are not charged while those who contribute are not remunerated. This idea of
market externalities and free-ridership has been the subject of hot debate (Shuttleworth, 1997;
Jaffe and Felder, 1996; Hirst, 1999; Rochlin 2004). Physical characteristics of power systems
and incumbent technologies have also been highlighted as contributing factors in market failure,
among them the inherited system of rate-based retail pricing which removes demand
participation from the market (Stoft, 2002).
According to many authors, one specific characteristic of electric power systems that
distinguishes electricity from other commodities is the inability for significant economical
storage. Without the ability to store electricity, consumers who require service cannot choose to
purchase excess when prices are low and forego purchases when prices rise. In this way, the
primary rationing mechanism of markets cannot function and consumers may be subject to
extreme price volatility (Creti and Fabra, 2003). In light of this, most power systems have been
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built and operated so that consumers do not face real time prices, but pay a preset rate for energy
largely without regard to time-of-use.
There is general consensus that the lack of robust demand-side participation in electricity
markets causes considerable problems for market operation (Hirst and Hadley, 1999; Fraser,
2001; Borenstein and Holland, 2002; Stoft, 2002; Creti & Fabra, 2003; Joskow, 2003; Rochlin
2004; Baldick et al, 2005; Cramton & Stoft, 2005). When the idealized market model is
proposed as a proper mechanism for pricing and distribution of resources in most contexts, a
general assumption is made that both supply and demand participate, expressing their
preferences in terms of prices and quantities. In power systems historically, on the other hand,
most consumers have received service insulated from the real-time circumstances in the
generation process.
In testimony before the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, Joskow (2003)
highlights certain attributes of an ideal energy market. Topping the list are the ability for
consumers to see and have the ability to respond to spot market prices, to express their valuation
of reliability of service in market transactions, have available various financial and contractual
tools to manage their risks and have the incentive to use them efficiently. For the most part,
these features are missing from power systems. Stoft (2002) and others argue that there are a
number of reasons why most consumers do not make their market decisions in real time,
including metering technology and the inherited retail service structure highlighted above.
Fraser (2001) argues that unresponsive demand is the primary factor necessitating “socialized
reliability solutions,” or capacity margins, because consumers are unable to express their value
of reliability in the marketplace.
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Other authors have cited the implementation of price caps in many markets (suppressing
legitimately high on-peak prices), risk aversion among investors and the exercise of market
power in concentrated systems as contributing to the failure of the spot market model to provide
sufficient available capacity (Oren, 2003; Vazquez et al, 2002; De Vries and Hakvoort, 2004).
Risk aversion, described by De Vries and Hakvoort as discouraging otherwise economic
investments, can be related to many underlying factors, including uncertainty surrounding future
revenue streams and possible regulatory and legislative action. Price caps are a feature in many
energy markets designed to shield consumers from extreme scarcity rents that could be charged
in shortage times. Many authors have suggested that this cap on prices makes recovery of fixed
costs in energy markets impossible, especially so because the electricity industry has such large
fixed costs relative to operating/variable costs.
Given the widespread belief among many in the field that energy-only markets cannot be
relied upon to ensure generation adequacy, a number of solutions have been proposed. The most
common type has been a form of capacity payment designed to provide an administratively
determined proxy value of available capacity to the marketplace, and to provide producers with
revenue to cover fixed costs. In its most basic form, the capacity payment is intended to address
the shortfall in fixed-cost-recovery created by a non-market determination of capacity adequacy
above the market equilibrium (Felder and Farr, 2005). Other proposals have included capacity
obligations placed on producers or on load, reliability contracts, energy options, mothball
reserves, and capacity subscriptions (Vazquez et al, 2002; Stoft, 2002; Doorman, 2003; Chao and
Wilson, 2004; Oren, 2003). The creation of forward reserve markets in the New England power
system has been another effort to provide additional revenue to generators that provide a
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premium capacity good in the form of quickly dispatchable generation capability held in reserve
(Cramton, Chao and Wilson, 2005).
Cramton and Stoft (2005) and others make the case that a capacity mechanism is
necessary in most deregulated power systems because of the negligible levels of demand
participation in the market for energy. They point out that past efforts at implementing capacity
markets, when they were done, were often fatally flawed and that well-designed capacity
markets can serve to ensure generation adequacy and remain politically feasible when coupled
with energy price caps.
Experiences with implemented energy markets have varied across the globe. Some
power systems have relied entirely on price signals and investment incentives from the spot
market to provide the proper investments in generation capacity. Most European power systems
operate this way, as does the Australian system. In the U.S., the most visible experience with
energy-only markets was the widely publicized string of price spikes and rolling blackouts in
California in the summer of 2000. 6 Weare, 2003, in a report on the California crisis, estimated
that total costs to the state amounted to between $40 billion and $45 billion, or 3.5% of annual
gross state output.
In the northeastern U.S., the markets implemented in 1999 and modifications presently
under consideration have included some type of extra mechanism to ensure generation capacity
investment (“installed capacity” or ICAP) as well as investment in peaking capacity (“forward

6

It should be noted, however, that other factors contributed besides market structure: While consensus on the causes
remains somewhat elusive, one contributing was that utilities who had been compelled to divest of many of their
generation assets were forced through circumstances to procure energy for their customers and in some cases
unexpected new customers on unfavorable terms in a chaotic environment. Weare, 2003, is an excellent source of
more information.

14

reserve market” or FRM) used to ensure energy reserves that the pure market would undersupply
(Cramton and Stoft, 2005).
Because private decisions about investment in a deregulated industry are made by market
participants based on the predicted profitability of a plant (using calculations of expected fixed
and variable costs and forecast revenue streams), addressing whether current and proposed
energy and ancillary service markets provide the right incentives is critical. The original
literature on electricity pricing in spot markets was predicated on certain assumptions of
underlying market fundamentals. Debate has focused in recent years on whether many of these
assumptions are valid. Because of the centrality of electricity to economic growth and
prosperity, as well as the potential risks posed by insecure power systems, the concern of
whether implemented market models can ensure socially optimal levels of reliable service is
central to policy discussions. The next section introduces some contemporary applications of
agent-based modeling to electric power markets.
1.3. How Agent-Based Modeling Has Been Used in Electric Power Market Applications
Ventosa, et al, 2005 distinguishes three types of modeling commonly used in the study of
electric power markets: optimization models, equilibrium models and simulation (or agentbased) models. Although there has been some overlap, this categorization serves an important
purpose in offering a foundation for researchers working in a field that has occasionally lacked
commonality of methods to facilitate reproducibility (this criticism has been lodged by Weidlich
and Veit, 2008).
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Optimization models restrict the analysis to the decision process of a single firm within a
complex market, and are the least explored of the three types. The second type, equilibrium
models, attempts to solve a mathematical program representing the decisions of all participants
in closed form. These are typically either Cournot (quantity-based) or Supply Function
Equilibrium (quantity and price-based) models, and have received significant attention both
independently and as part of benchmarking efforts for the third type, simulation (Klemperer and
Meyer, 1989; Hobbs and Helman, 2004; Waltman and Kaymak, 2008). Because simulation is
the approach to be used here, interested readers are referred to Ventosa, et al, 2005 for more
literature on non-simulation electric power market modeling.
The third modeling approach, simulation, here referred to synonymously as agent-based
modeling (ABM), or sometimes as agent-based computational economics (ACE), has received
significant attention for its general framework and the ability to surmount many of the
computational limitations of equilibrium models (Fagiolo, et al, 2007). Many equilibrium
models suffer from the inability to model more than very simplified transmission systems and
few active decision-makers (Hobbs and Helman, 2004). On the other hand, ABM, while
potentially a very powerful modeling tool usable for almost every conceivable application related
to power market analysis and transmission systems of complexity approaching the real world,
has some crucial weaknesses (which are all-to-infrequently emphasized in most ABM literature),
and has received its own share of criticism. Most often, these are criticisms of the modelers,
whose results are presented without a) benchmarked results or b) robust proofs of the relevance
of the results (Weidlich and Veit, 2008). On the other hand, with the spread of ABM concepts
among applied economics researchers, greater attention has recently been paid to these
omissions, including renewed efforts at benchmarking results against real-world observed
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phenomena (Fagiolo, et al, 2007) and defining common frameworks for easy comparison
(Midgley, et al, 2007; Marks, 2007). Leombruni and Richiardi, 2005, offer a useful summary of
remaining issues with ABM methodology in their exploration of why it hasn’t received greater
attention from top-ranking journals.
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CHAPTER 2
AGENT-BASED MODELING: THE CONTEXT OF THIS RESEARCH
The project below is an application of agent-based modeling using reinforcement
learning (a popular machine learning approach). As described above, electric power market
modeling has taken three general forms, although there has been some overlap: Optimization
models, equilibrium models and simulation models (Ventosa, et al, 2005). Simulation models, of
which the proposed research project is one, are useful for situations in which the complexity of
the desired model makes equilibrium analysis impractical. In a simulation model, firms are
represented as autonomous agents, where the structure of the agents is general (much research in
the collateral field of machine learning regards agent structures and the performance of these
agents under various types of environments; see below for greater depth of coverage on agent
models, or Kaelbling, Littman and Moore, 1996 or Sutton and Barto, 1998). A fourth model that
has received little attention and is omitted mention in Ventosa, et al, 2008, is human-subject
experiments, in which human players take on the role of a generation firm. A possible reason for
this for this omission, and a motivating factor in agent-based modeling, is that the learning curve
for operating a portfolio of assets even in a much simplified market is steep for human-subjects,
making experiments of this form of limited utility (Weidlich and Veit, 2008). 7
Agent-based modeling is a simulation technique particularly suitable to the study of
complex systems, such as electric power markets, for which analytical, closed form, solutions do
not exist or are impractical to discover. While there are several ABM approaches that have been
7

This isn’t to say that the learning curve for a computer agent is much shorter, but an ideal adaptive agent, lacking
in heuristics that humans can use, for better or worse, may be able to learn the complex tasks faster due to
computational speed advantages.
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applied to modeling electricity markets, the most prevalent use adaptive agents with some type
of a reinforcement learning algorithm for online learning. Reinforcement learning is
significantly founded on Thorndike’s Law of Effect, in which those actions an agent (or animal)
takes which result in immediate positive reward will be repeated more often and vice versa. A
drawback to ABM, which has been mentioned throughout the literature, is precisely that proofs
of optimality or even demonstration of realism through benchmarking are difficult and these
limitations have received little attention relative to the substantial reported work in the field
(Weidlich and Veit, 2008) 8 .
However, a counterbalancing factor is that much ABM research borrows lessons and
insights from substantial existing research in the fields of artificial intelligence and reinforcement
learning (Bunn and Oliveira, 2001; Bagnall and Smith, 2005; Veit, et al, 2006). An example in
the field is Waltman and Kaymak, 2008, in which they demonstrate both analytically and
through ABM in a Cournot market that Q-Learning agents collude to raise prices above a
competitive equilibrium. 9
At the root of ABM are the agents that act autonomously according to their own
individual algorithms and the rules of the model. The general structure involves an agent that in
a single stage or iteration of the simulation takes an action according to its policy, receives
information and a reward (or calculates the reward itself from the environment message passed
to it) and updates its policy by which future actions will be selected. ABM is especially useful
8

Benchmarking is difficult for another reason, namely that industry data are often hard to retrieve, and that market
outcomes are significantly impacted by operating procedures which, though they attempt to balance reliability and
cost reasonably, are constantly evolving and differ from control area to control area.
9
Occasionally, the term Q-Learning is used synonymously with learning that simply utilizes a general reinforcement
update algorithm. Strictly speaking, Q-Learning relates more to dynamic programming, in which reward values are
backpropagated from values of subsequent states and actions to those of antecedent states and actions. Q-Learning
particularly is “off-policy”, contrasted with “on-policy” learning, but this distinction is beyond the scope of this
report. See Sutton and Barto, 1998 for more (available free online at
http://webdocs.cs.ualberta.ca/~sutton/book/ebook/index.html)
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for studying complex systems that are not easily analyzed with traditional modeling techniques,
in particular in the case of economic systems, where the real subjects of interest are often the
emergent macro-phenomena that result from interactions between hundreds, thousands or
millions of economic actors. While laboratory game experiments using human participants as
generators can discover market flaws at risk for exploitation, there is a limit to how complex a
system can be analyzed in these economic experiments. Especially in the case of real-world
power systems, suppliers often control multiple plants in different locations on the transmission
grid (often in multi-settlement or multi-stage markets with more than one product) and the
learning curve for a human playing the part of a supplier with a portfolio of these plants can be
steep, often prohibitively so.
Adaptive-agent-based modeling is especially suited to analyzing electricity markets (with
certain important caveats, high among them the exponential relationship between environment
complexity and task complexity) because participating agents can often quickly search through
their policy-space for successful strategies even given a potentially very complex problem to
address. Many obstacles exist to reaching this goal of building agents able to learn strategies in
environments of great complexity (such as the non-stationary nature of an environment
composed of more than one learning agent), and some of these are detailed in this report, but
overall experience to date has shown promise in this field. The motivation for the work
described in this report comes from the observation that the field of agent design is relatively
new and many potential avenues of research into agent design (and the suitability of particular
designs to electric power market modeling) have not yet been exhaustively explored.
Generally there have been two approaches researchers have taken to ABM over the last
couple of decades. One has been to attempt to design agents that approximate the behavior of
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human-subjects (Erev and Roth, 1995), while the other has disregarded benchmarking agent
behavior to those of humans and explored emergent phenomena in environments with many
agents following simple heuristics in decision-making (Bunn and Bower, 1999, for example).
The results of these early experiments showed the potential of ABM to model complex
phenomena emerging from simple foundations. Approaching the field of ABM from the
direction of benchmarking, Axelrod (1987) used genetic algorithms to model agents participating
in an iterated prisoner’s dilemma. Erev and Roth (1998) built upon this work with agents
participating in simple games in a study on using learning algorithms to predict how humans
learn to play matrix games 10 with mixed-strategy equilibria. More recently, Abdallah and Lesser
(2008) have provided further analysis of the performance of a community of reinforcement
learning agents, evaluating the convergence capabilities of several learning algorithms on some
standard matrix-payoff games with pure and mixed-strategy Nash Equilibria. Nicolaisen, et al
(2001) explores applications of a modified Roth-Erev (MRE) reinforcement learning algorithm
in electricity market simulations, and has the advantage of using agent models that have been
demonstrated to realistically approximate human behavior in simple applications in relatively
complex power systems (incorporating a multi-node transmission model; Somani and Tesfatsion,
2008). Other applications of ABM to electricity markets are covered in (Bower and Bunn, 1999;
Bunn and Oliveira, 2001; Bagnall and Smith, 2005). Bagnall and Smith, 2005, applies ABM to

10

Littman, 1994, describes a matrix game, in the context of game theory, as simply a deterministic reward function
Ri,j for the first of two agents choosing action i and their opponent choosing action j. And offers the zero-sum game
“rock, paper, scissors” in their exploration of Q-Learning in a multi-agent context:
(Agent 1 reward, Agent 2 reward)
Rock
Paper
Scissors

Rock
(0, 0)
(1, -1)
(-1, 1)
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Paper
(-1, 1)
(0, 0)
(1, -1)

Scissors
(1, -1)
(-1, 1)
(0, 0)

the UK electricity markets under the New Electricity Trading Agreement (or NETA) using
relatively sophisticated learning classifier system agents that incorporate a genetic algorithm
applied to encoded rules of behavior.
Agents that can develop policies through trial-and-error interaction with their
environments are especially interesting for use in agent-based modeling. Well-designed adaptive
agents have the potential to independently discover strategies in complex environments beyond
what can be reasonably hard-coded into heuristic agents or expected of human gameparticipants. In this way, some of the key benefits of human-participant experimental economics
(discovery of unforeseen strategies/policies) can be incorporated into more robust modeling tools
for real world applications. On the other hand, sufficiently complex adaptive agents can retain
the ability for direct optimization (when such programming subroutines are part of their action
sets) in decision-making that human participants cannot (Bagnall and Smith, 2005 describe their
process of agent-design clearly; Dariani, et al, 2008 treat precise design of both adaptive and
non-adaptive agents with several parts, of which a value function for determining a policy can be
one). This capability is especially relevant for ABM applications to electricity markets because a
successful power supplier strategy may require close coordination between generating plants
controlled by the agent at different locations on the power grid. Relatively sophisticated agents
capable of solving these complex problems using mathematical programming with equilibrium
constraints (MPECs) have been implemented in modeled electricity markets (an example of
combining optimization modeling with simulation; Entriken and Wan, 2005). There may be
significant promise in combining agent learning with these existing mathematical programming
tools available to an agent, but the author is unaware of this sort of application to date.
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Essentially an adaptive agent competing in a modeled market is faced with the task of
discovering strategies that will maximize their profits (or in some cases attempt to optimize with
respect to multiple objectives) by searching the space of potential policies through online
interaction with their environment (other agents and the market clearing mechanism or market
module). The complexity of agents that have been implemented in market models varies widely,
as do the broad agent structures used.
In early work on reinforcement learning, optimality proofs were demonstrated for an
agent learning in a stationary environment (not necessarily deterministic, but stochastic with
fixed probability distributions). When the task faced by a learning agent is non-stationary (which
it is whenever a second learning agent is part of the market environment), the optimality proofs
provided in many reinforcement learning agent research (Bertsekas and Tsitsiklis, 1996; Sutton
and Barto, 1998) may not exist.
2.1. Challenges and Opportunities
There are many challenges to developing robust electric power system models with
adaptive agents, many of which were described above. Perhaps the greatest challenge involves
building confidence in the results. Section 1.1 introduced the most relevant complicating factors
of electric power markets and provided some treatment of the motivations for this research. Here
we summarize the greatest challenges facing ABM researchers in exploring dynamics of realistic
electric power markets in their models.
1. Electric power systems are complex.
2. The dynamics of competitive electricity markets are poorly understood.
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3. Analytical solutions are mostly or completely unattainable for optimal behavior in
even relatively simple models of electric power systems (this is especially true for
multi-agent models and for other models incorporating non-stationary
phenomena).
4. Human-participant experiments are of limited use in electric power market
models, due to the complexity of the task an agent with a portfolio of generating
plants participating in multiple inter-connected markets faces.
5. Agent-based modeling is a relatively new tool for modeling economic systems,
but offers promise as a compromise environment for evaluating market structures
and participant behavior.
6. Most models lack realism (real world power markets, as described above, are
complex, interconnected, multi-faceted and mutable).
7. Lack of realism of the agents (even the most sophisticated agents have limitations
that become pronounced as the complexity of the task environment increases).
8. Proprietary nature of power system data.
9. Non-scalability of existing agent learning models to realistic scenarios. Even
those multi-agent reinforcement learning models which demonstrate convergence
in non-stationary environments have only been applied to very simple games.
This research project is motivated by several interconnected factors, and is an attempt to
address as many of these issues as possible. First, there is a well-understood need to have
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electric power market modeling tools that can reliably and quickly approximate real-world
conditions and predict market behavior under variable conditions. To a significant extent,
research to date has either been devoted to modeling the physical power system as accurately as
possible and omitting strategic participant behavior (including state estimators used in ISO
system operations, and generator commitment and dispatch algorithms are examples), or has
sacrificed the detail of most physical power systems to focus on agent behavior. Some
exceptions that attempt both include work reported in Conzelman, et al, 2004, Bagnall and
Smith, 2005, Sun and Tesfatsion, 2006, and Somani and Tesfatsion, 2008. The model detailed
here incorporates, as mentioned before, a multi-node transmission model with locational
marginal prices, features central to the Standard Market Design put forward by the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission in its early orders mandating a move towards open competitive
electric power markets. Other features that will be necessary to incorporate into future models
include multi-settlement systems, non-linear commitment and dispatch algorithms, dynamic
load, demand-side participation and more. 11
Second, there continues to be insufficient acknowledgement of the particular strengths
and weaknesses of reinforcement learning-based agents used in ABM research. This has likely
been caused by the inaccessibility of much reinforcement learning research to those who are not
theorists in the field, combined with a possibly unjustified confidence among electric power
market modeling practitioners in the abilities of these agents in complex multi-agent

11

Veit, et al, 2006 do incorporate these features into a model similar to the one used in our research, but the
complexity introduced there is not explicitly addressed for its impact on the dimensionality of the agents’ tasks. In
general learning agents must sample from their action set a very large number of times (positively proportional to
the number of possible environment states) in order to learn a task. While non-stationary task environments, such as
two interacting learning agents comprise, admittedly do not have convergence or optimality proofs, as the ratio of
possible environment states to the number of rounds run in a simulation increases, so does the chance that particular
states are never encountered, which intuitively adversely impacts learning in a multi-agent environment.
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environments (this author has been one). While recent attempts have been made to demonstrate
analytically the applicability of Q-Learning agents (such as Waltman and Kaymak, 2008) far too
little attention has been paid to robustly demonstrate the advantages of adaptive agents in electric
power market models.
Any attempt at modeling a complex environment must begin with an understanding of
both the capabilities and limitations of the tools available as well as a vision of the endgame
(what features an ideal product would have). The obstacles to implementing learning algorithms
in models such as this one, that are well known in the reinforcement learning community,
include the challenges of representing continuous and high-dimensional environments for an
agent to develop realistic situational awareness (see “the curse of dimensionality”; Bertsekas and
Tsitsiklas, 1996), and the significant amount of time, in terms of both modeling rounds and
computing time, needed for optimal behavior to be learned (in cases where optimality proofs
exist) or convergence to be achieved (if it does at all). For these reasons researchers in electric
power market modeling commonly sacrifice some aspects of an ideal agent structure for
tractability (with good reason, although often these sacrifices are left unacknowledged). A
frequent sacrifice made is to omit state awareness and take advantage of evidence provided in
earlier work on the realism of agent-learning and behavior with respect to human learning (Erev
and Roth’s work on predicting human game playing with reinforcement learning agents is widely
cited, and widely used; Sun and Tesfatsion, 2006, Veit et al, 2006, Somani and Tesfatsion,
2008). However, without state awareness, agents are essentially blind to market conditions. 12 A
compensating effort that is common is to benchmark results of a multi-agent model with real12

This shortcoming is a factor in the present version of the market model, but state awareness (and all the challenges
accompanying it) is a feature that will have to be incorporated in future multi-agent reinforcement learning research
on electric power markets.
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world data, although comprehensive attribution of specific agent features and modeling
assumptions to simulation results is lacking (Fagioli, et al, 2008). Another challenge is the
limited availability of much power system data, as they are owned by private entities including
system operators, transmission owners and electric utilities.
The reinforcement learning literature is particularly valuable for its attention to
categorizing task environments that agents face. From the simple Markov decision process
(MDP, which has the Markov property) to partially observable Markov decision processes
(POMDPs) and non-stationary POMDPs (the latter two of which don’t have the Markov
property), the limitations imposed on the research are explicitly acknowledged. From this
literature, it is possible to glean insights into the task that a representative agent in a market
model environment faces (Littman, 1994 does a good job of this). In most research applications
that utilize reinforcement learning, the task environment isn’t explicitly described (Xiong,
Okuma and Fujita, 2004; Rahimiyan and Mashhadi, 2008). This is the case with almost all ABM
models cited here. This makes the extension of work such as Abdallah and Lesser, 2008, (in
which the task environment is explicitly described in terms of joint reward functions) to complex
environments difficult, though in their paper, the authors cite some promising directions being
explored in multi-agent learning applications in iterative matrix games involving a general
number of agents, beyond the two that Abdallah and Lesser use (Tuyls, et al, 2006).
Some promising recent research has been done in the RL field on so-call multi-agent
reinforcement learning (MARL) applications (of which this research project is one; Krause, et al,
2005; Abdallah and Lesser, 2008). In these lines of research, the non-stationary stochastic nature
of the single-agent’s task (reward function) is placed within the context of a community of
agents, in which case the payoff to all agents is a deterministic function of the agents’ collective
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actions (a mapping from joint-policy space to a vector of rewards to each agent). 13 Abdallah and
Lesser report on work they’ve done to explore learning processes and convergence of various
learning algorithms in non-stationary n-armed bandit problems (the single-agent perspective of
multi-agent games with known pure or mixed-strategy Nash Equilibria). The primary difficulty
with borrowing too much from this line of exploration is that many of the most interesting
applications are ones where payoff functions of joint-policies are not clear, particularly in the asyet unapplied electric market model incorporating realistic features of existing power systems
(multi-node transmission system with locational market pricing, multi-settlement rules, ancillary
services, stochastic loads, price-responsive demand, etc.).
Often, in much of the electric power market ABMs, explicit framing of the task
environment is left out because either classification is difficult or would be unhelpful even if the
class were known. This is the case with almost ABM to date applications (present company
included) that use reinforcement learning. Reinforcement learning has been proven to discover
optimal behavior only under extremely restrictive assumptions, including properly-calibrated
parameter adjustments and a stationary environment (Sutton and Barto, 1998), some that are
necessarily missing from all simulations in which more than one adaptive agent is used (such as
Xiong, Okuma and Fujita, 2004; Rahimiyan and Mashhadi, 2008). This is because the presence
of another adaptive agent makes the environment non-stationary and non-Markov.
To the author’s knowledge, little of the most recent research in reinforcement learning
(such as Abdallah and Lesser, 2008) has been utilized in agent-based modeling of electric power
13

The task environment in the model described below is technically a matrix game, although with 225 possible
combinations of actions, explicit framing of the joint-reward function under varied topologies and plant-node
assignments is prohibitive. The otherwise excellent model presented in Veit, et al, contains an [estimated] 3.25 *
10128 possible joint actions and environment states, making it impractical for agents to fully learn tasks, unless
generalization is used in the learning algorithms (see Sutton and Barto, 1998 for very good treatment of
generalization in reinforcement learning).
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markets. This is a primary motivator for the research below, although the omission of state
representation leaves something to be desired in modeling power markets, particularly those
models that would incorporate multi-settlement market features and inter-temporal constraints.
There is a necessary trade-off when you move from a task environment with a
reinforcement learning agent that is embedded in an environment having the Markov property to
one that doesn’t. When you leave the Markov property behind, you enter the realm where
success is measured by convergence and benchmarking against real-world data, and this is often
tenuous.
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CHAPTER 3
THE ELECTRICITY MARKET MODEL
Green and Newberry (1992) and others have made the case for using quantity-based or
supply function modeling, as equilibrium results of Bertrand (price-based analysis) models show
competitive outcomes in even very concentrated markets, which is counterintuitive and
contradicted by results from other models (Banal-Estanol and Micola, 2009). Another case that
can be made for using quantity-based or supply function-based models is that they have greater
realism: In most extant competitive electric power markets, the exercise of market power through
price-manipulation is closely monitored and mitigated through robust rules and market monitors
endowed with non-trivial referral authority. Less well understood is the effect of physical
withholding on market outcomes, particularly because generator outages and reductions are a
common occurrence, even unplanned ones (or “forced outages”). Therefore, absent blatant
misrepresentation or an incriminating paper trail, anticompetitive manipulation of physical
parameters is challenging to catch and to prove, although penalties for misrepresentation of an
asset’s availability (whether in-service when it is not, or vice versa) are nontrivial. For this
reason, we constructed a market model in which agents compete on quantity rather than price (an
advantage is that the path here isn’t entirely untrod; Waltman and Kaymak, 2008, also explored
using Q-Learning agents in a Cournot model, as did Veit, et al, 2006). The market model
contains a clearing engine built upon an open-sourced mathematical optimization package (LP
Solve 14 ), which has a multi-node transmission system with locational marginal pricing (LMP).

14

lpsolve.sourceforge.net/5.5/
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The motivation for this research is to further development of flexible, scalable and
reliable market models. The promise of these goals are models that can help training of system
operators, regulatory/policy-making, refining of market rules and general understanding of the
short-run and long-run dynamics of competitive electric power markets under general initial
conditions.
3.1. Where This Research Fits: What’s New Under the Sun?
The agent-based model we developed and describe below finds good company among
those that have been reviewed and reported on in the contemporary literature on modeling
electricity markets. Inspired by early results of agent-based electric power market modeling
(such as Bunn and Bower, 1999) and reinforcement learning applications in stationary and
cooperative tasks (Littman, 1994; Sutton and Barto, 1998, Nicolaisen, et al, 2001, and others),
development of linearized direct-current optimal power flow models (Chao and Peck, 1996),
first-hand experience with system operations 15 and recent work exploring convergence of multiagent reinforcement learning models in matrix games (Abdallah and Lesser, 2009), the model
described here attempts to incorporate lessons from disparate fields to both identify avenues of
improvement to the existing body of electric power ABM research, and demonstrate tractability
in a simplified case. The intention is to contribute to this exciting field in several ways:
First, the economic model used in this research project closely resembles the real-world
conditions of the power industry we are attempting to simulate. As Banal-Estanol and Micola,
2009, and others have noted, real-world generator owners typically bid their units in piecewise
tranches of capacity, as our agents do. Additionally, operating costs of most widely-used
15

Some of the work reported here was done during a period of time when the author was also an employee of ISO
New England Inc.’s Internal Market Monitoring Unit (INTMMU). No non-public information is disclosed here.
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generator technologies are known to be within a narrow range around a linear relationship with
fuel prices. With most power systems incorporating robust price-mitigation measures, market
manipulation through price manipulation is both difficult and rare. A more practical and difficult
to detect method of manipulation involves capacity withholding, either through complete plant
outages, partial plant reductions or misrepresentation of operating parameters. It is our
contention that more research on quantity-based models is appropriate.
Second, as several other researchers, but not all, have also done, we incorporate a
transmission system into the model. We show that this is both practical and the agents
successfully converge to equilibria that take advantage of transmission congestion to increase
profits.
Third, although we were not able to incorporate those newly developed learning
algorithms that have demonstrated success in complex non-cooperative games where others,
such as the Q-Learning update algorithm we use, fail, the model is immensely flexible for future
extension. As additional market features are incorporated into agent-based models (day-ahead
commitment and dispatch, with real-time balancing, ancillary services and demandparticipation), it is expected that equilibria (if existence is shown) will be more difficult for
agents to discover, in which case new and different learning algorithms will be needed.
3.2. Predecessor Model
The first version of the market model described in this report consisted of a simple
electric power market with two or more agents competing to supply fixed demand by submitting
price offers for their full capacity up to an offer cap of $20 16 . There was no transmission model

16

These results were earlier presented in Miksis, 2006.
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(like the current version described below contains). The decision process of the adaptive agents
(to distinguish from the fixed-action agent that submitted a single static price offer every round)
was to modify their previous round price offer by one of several multiplier factors (0.5 to 2).
Consistent with previous research in reinforcement learning agents in a stationary task, initial
simulations showed that an adaptive agent could successfully discover optimal behavior in
several load scenarios. In each round, the market module solicited actions from each agent and
ran a least-cost optimization to match supply with demand. Three scenarios were run and
reported on:
The first scenario involved a single adaptive Q-Learning agent (with a cost of $0)
competing against a static opponent offering a constant price. Each agent had a fixed capacity of
1,000 MW, while load was also 1,000 MW. In this case, the agent offering the lower price
would clear and serve the entire load, while the other would not.
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Figure 1. Q-Agent and $10 Static Offer Opponent, 1,000 MW Load

The adaptive agent’s profit function is piecewise linear, increasing from an offer of $0
($0 profit) to $9.99 ($9,999 profit) and dropping to $0 profit at offers higher than $10,000 (tiebreaking was 50/50 random, so at $10 exactly, expected profit was $5,000). The results are
shown in Figure 1; the non-linear series is the adaptive agent’s offer series (moving average to
address noise during the simulation). The agent learned relatively quickly to just underbid the
static price agent.
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Figure 2. Q-Agent and $10 Static Offer Opponent, 1,400 MW Load

Figure 2 shows the second scenario in which load is raised to 1,400 MW; the other
parameters are unchanged. While both agents will necessarily clear and the uniform clearing
price will be set to the higher offer, the agent that sets price will clear only 400 MW. Therefore,
the choice for the adaptive agent is really between offering at the price cap and receiving a profit
of $8,000 ($20 * 400 MW) versus offering below $10 and clearing its full capacity, for a profit
of $10,000. As the figure shows, the agent quickly learned to make the second choice.
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Figure 3. Q-Agent and $10 Static Offer Opponent, 1,600 MW Load

Figure 3 shows the third scenario, in which load is raised to 1,600 MW. In this case, the
optimal behavior is to bid at the price cap of $20 (profit = $12,000) rather than bidding low
(profit = $10,000). The agent successfully learned this. The results showed the promise of an
adaptive agent using a Q-Learning algorithm in a stationary scenario with a uniform clearing
price market structure similar to real-world electric power markets.
3.3. Current Market Model Description
The new version of the market model used in this research is significantly more complex
than that used in Miksis, 2006. It is built with the same fundamental design as the real-time
scheduling, pricing and dispatch (SPD) algorithms used by power system operators to manage
least-cost dispatch of electric power generating stations and other assets; it is similarly comprised
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of a transmission system, loads and generating assets, with physical and economic parameters.
At a basic level, power transmission systems are composed of nodes and lines, each of which
connect two or more nodes (infrequently more than two), while assets are located at nodes on the
grid. In reality, most power systems are made up of hundreds or thousands of nodes, lines,
generators and other assets. The model used in the simulations described later is a muchsimplified representation of an actual power system, including only 5 nodes, 6 lines and 25
generators (5 agents controlling 5 generators each). Figure 4 shows the system used in this
research project.
As described above, power systems are extremely fragile machines. In order to maintain
reliable delivery of power, system operators must perform least-cost dispatch optimization while
respecting many physical constraints: Generators must be dispatched at or below their maximum
capacity (and occasionally there are nonlinearities imposed by the binary on/off decisions with a
unit operating at zero, at a minimum output, somewhere above minimum, or at maximum),
power lines must not transfer electricity in excess of their thermal limits and load at every node
on the system must be matched with supply (Kirchhoff’s current law declares that nodal balance
is respected: the sum of injections, line inflows, line outflows and withdrawals equals zero).
Because electric power flows through a network according to physical laws, and for the most
part cannot be directed from point to point along a particular path, these laws must be translated
into constraints in the dispatch model, so that power injections and withdrawals at each node are
made to ensure power flows respect all thermal transmission line limits. A key point is that in a
transmission network a unit of power (MW) injected at one point, conventionally called a source,
and withdrawn at another, called a sink, will flow partially along every possible path between the
two locations; how much energy flows along each path is determined by the line resistance (in
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the case of direct-current, or DC, models) or impedance (in the case of alternating-current, or
AC, models) 17 . To aid in the dispatch of the system, these line resistances for a given network
are used to pre-calculate factors, known as power transfer distribution factors (“PTDFs”), for
each triplet (source node/power line/sink node) to determine how much (0 to 1, or 0% to 100%)
of a MW injected at the source and withdrawn at the sink flows along the line.
A further simplifying process decomposes this factor into two others, called generator
shift factors (or sometimes just shift factors), representing first, the PTDF from the sink to a
chosen reference node and second the PTDF from reference node to the sink (the chosen
reference node uniquely determines every GSF, but does not change the resulting power flows or
prices). This is done to simplify the calculation of power flows when modeling line constraints.18
While real-world power systems must be dispatched respecting hundreds or thousands of
constraints (including not only thermal line limits, but also generator capacity constraints,
upward and downward ramp limitations, post-contingency reliability line transfer limits 19 ,
stability/voltage limits and more), the model used in this research contains only 25 generator
capacity constraints and 12 thermal line limit constraints (lines are bi-directional, so a constraint
must impose lower and upper bound flows), plus the energy balance equality constraint.

17

The market model used in this research is, for practical reasons, built upon a DC system.
A GSF for a node-line pair allows the linear program to respect line constraints using a single GSF coefficient on
each decision variable; because of the system energy balance equality constraint, the dispatch will ensure that each
MW injected and “sent” to the reference node is matched by an offsetting MW “sent” from the reference node to the
sink/withdrawal node.
19
We have already described the fragility of power systems. Because power flows adjust almost instantaneously in
response to changes in the system, if a line “trips” out of service, the power that previously flowed on that line is
directed along other paths. This can overload these lines, which can lead to cascading failure as protection systems
will automatically trip lines that are overloaded to avoid permanent equipment damage. Consequently, power flow
on lines are limited not to their actual thermal limit rating, but to the level at which the lines that would pick up their
flows could carry if the line in question did trip. For this reason, in industry parlance, line constraints are sometimes
referred to as “line x onto line y”.
18
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The simulations performed as part of this research are repeated single-round runs of the
market model, which means that inter-temporal ramp constraints are not needed. Additionally,
the dispatch levels of generators are lower-bounded at zero, so that the non-linear binary
commitment decision is not a part of the model. With these restrictions, the problem is linear,
and as such, is easy and quick to solve with off-the-shelf linear programming packages.
3.3.1. The Power System Model
Having described the general components of a simplified power system model, we next
introduce the model used in this research: first, the physical system, then the market mechanics
(3.3.2 and 3.3.3) and lastly, the agents (3.3.4). As mentioned, there are 5 nodes in the system
model, with 6 lines connecting them in a network (the nodes are circles and the transmission
lines are squares):

Figure 4. Modeled Power System Diagram
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The resistances used for the lines were borrowed from a public system model used in
training tools by the ISO New England Inc. and PJM regional transmission organizations. 20
Table 2 in Appendix B shows the relevant data and the generator shift factors derived from the
resistances. The data in the table are not significant unless understood in context. What they
mean, for example, is that a MW injected at Node 3 and withdrawn at the reference flows
through the network as shown in Figure 5 (reading down the 3Æ2 column, we see that 16%
flows in the direction from Node 3 to Node 4 along Line 5; because of nodal balance at Node 4,
this 16% continues along Line 2 to Node 0, etc.; lines are directional only for the purpose of
calculating power flows).

Figure 5. Line Flow Demonstration with Node 3 Injection

Because GSFs are additive, to calculate flows on Line 5 caused by an injection at Node 3
and a withdrawal at Node 4, we add 16% (GSFNode3,Line5) to 32% (-1 * -32% = -1 * GSFNode4,Line5, because we are withdrawing instead of injecting at node 4). This equals the PTDF

20

See http://www.iso-ne.com/support/training/5bus/index.html.
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on Line 5 from an injection at Node 3 and a withdrawal at Node 4. It is then clear that, although
GSFs are uniquely determined by the choice of the reference node, the choice is arbitrary for
purposes of calculating power flows and prices. 21
Now that we have an understanding of the mechanics of the 5-node model used in the
simulations, we will discuss the three other components of the complete market model, the leastcost dispatch, pricing and congestion, and the agents.
3.3.2. Least-Cost Dispatch
The problem of minimizing total dispatch cost is linear. Each decision variable
corresponds to output of a generator, while the cost coefficient of each variable is the price offer
of that unit (used for brevity synonymously with generator; more on this in the “Agents” section,
3.3.4.). The objective function is therefore:

∑

a ∈ A (set of agents; 0 to 4); p ∈ P (set of plants; 0 to 4)

ca , p xa , p

(i)

a, p

The most important constraint in all power systems is the energy balance equality
constraint (supply MUST equal demand at all times). Therefore, the first constraint is:

∑
a, p

xa , p = ∑ nodalLoad n

(ii)

n

As c , nodalLoad is also an input to the optimization, determining as implied, the load
(electric power demand) at each of the 5 nodes n. The next set of constraints ensure that the
output of each unit (a,p) is not greater than its capacity capacitya,p.

xa , p ≤ capacitya , p ∀ a ∈ A, p ∈ P

(iii)

21

This is not strictly true in AC systems, where losses are modeled. Litvinov et al, 2004 discuss the choice and
consequence of reference nodes.
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Finally, there are the line limits (maximum flow in either direction, modelled as positive
and negative flows in the convention used above), which are similarly inputs to the simulation.
The variable nr is used to denote a non-reference node ∈ (0,1,3,4), as we omit the reference
node from line flow calculations. The matrix GSF is shown in Table 2 (Appendix B).

∑ GSF

NI nr ≤ lineLimit line ∀ line ∈ L (set of lines; 0 to 5)

(iv)

∑ GSF

NI nr ≥ −lineLimit line ∀ line ∈ L

(v)

line , nr

nr

line , nr

nr

NInr is the net injection (possibly negative, in which case it’s a net withdrawal) at the nonreference node nr.

NInr =

∑x

a, p

na , p ,nr − nodalLoad nr ∀ nr ∈ (0,1,3,4)

(vi)

a, p

where na,p,nr

= 1 if plant p of agent a is located at node nr

(vii)

= 0 otherwise
The last set of constraints is that which ensures non-negativity; although in real-world
power systems there are assets that can become net consumers (pump storage hydroelectric
facilities and flywheels are two examples), the units in our model are assumed to be traditional
thermal power plants, dispatchable from zero to capacity:

xa , p ≥ 0 ∀ a ∈ A,

p∈P

(viii)

Altogether, (i) through (viii) comprise the least-cost dispatch algorithm.
3.3.3. Pricing and Congestion
In most modern power systems, prices are determined nodally (so-called locational
marginal pricing, or LMP). The term “locational” indicates that prices differ across the power
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system, while marginal indicates that the system uses uniform pricing 22 ; the price at any location
is exactly equal to the marginal change in the objective function caused by an incremental MW
delivered there (net withdrawal off of the system). 23
In a DC model without losses, the normal case where no transmission line constraints are
binding has the marginal cost to deliver an additional MW anywhere on the grid equal to the
shadow price of the energy balance equation, which is always binding (it is often denoted λ).
Intuitively, this will be equal to the cost coefficient of the unit providing the last increment of
energy (in the case of no binding transmission constraints), equivalently the most expensive unit
online; this unit is known in the industry as the marginal unit.
In cases where one or more transmission lines are binding, there will be more than one
marginal unit. It is a truism that, except in the degenerate case of identically-priced and
identically-located units, there will always be one greater number of marginal units than the
number of binding transmission constraints. The shadow prices of binding transmission
constraints are traditionally labelled μ. The formula for calculating LMPs is:
LMPnr = λ +

∑ μ GSF
k

k , nr

∀ nr ∈ (0,1,3,4)

(ix)

k

where GSFk,nr is the generator shift factor corresponding to the line whose upper or lower
limit is binding and non-reference node nr. For the reference node, the LMP is always equal to λ
(or “system λ”), the marginal cost to deliver an additional MW to the reference node (there is no
congestion component of LMP at the reference).

22

Xiong, Okuma and Fujita, 2004 have addressed a comparison between pay-as-bid and uniform pricing in their
multi-agent simulation research. Kahn, et al, 2001 provides an excellent overview of the comparison.
23
It will be noted that revenues collected by generators will not equal the objective function. The objective of leastcost dispatch is not to minimize the total electricity bill paid by consumers, but to minimize production costs.
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Two interesting phenomena worth noting are observed with locational marginal pricing.
First is that, in cases of transmission congestion, the system λ will not equal the marginal cost of
a single marginal unit, but will be a function of the costs of all marginal units (determined by
system topology, and equivalently shift factors). Secondly, occasionally the LMP at a location
will be higher than the highest price offer submitted by any unit 24 .
3.3.4. Agents
Agents are arguably the most important component of this market model. Conceptually,
an agent is an autonomous software agent with an interface for interacting with the outside
world, in this case the modelled power system and market clearing mechanism. In our context,
each agent represents a power generating company with a portfolio of 5 plants. The agent
interacts with the market in two ways: by taking action and by receiving reward. It would be a
stretch to assign volition or awareness to the agents in our context, but through the actionselection mechanism and the value-function-update mechanism, the agents, over iterations of the
market, are designed to behave in ways that increase their profits.
Each agent controls 5 plants, each situated (possibly independently of each other) at one
of the 5 nodes. The default capacity of every plant is 500 MW, while the costs of the plants, in
increasing cost order are $0, $40, $80, $150 and $600/MW, respectively. These parameters
(location, capacity and cost) are modifiable by the modeller at the beginning of each simulation;
a simulation is set of a predetermined number of rounds).

24

This is well-known in the power industry and results from the fact that the possibility exists that maintaining nodal
balance when delivering an additional MW to a particular node will require adjusting dispatch elsewhere on the grid
such that cheap generation in several locations must be replaced with more expensive generation; as the locational
marginal price equals the change to the total objective function, this incremental energy can be very expensive when
several MW (or more) of expensive generation displace cheap generation)
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Agents have a set of 32 actions, consisting of all combinations of their 5 plants either inservice or out-of-service (25). In contrast to most ABM research, the agents here are competing
on quantity rather than price. The price-offer for each unit is fixed and equal to the marginal cost
(for purposes of calculating profit; if a $600 unit clears and the LMP at the node is $600, the
profit it $0). Because determining quantity offered is the decision of each agent, it is therefore
possible that the agents collectively may offer insufficient capacity to meet load, or offer their
portfolios in a way that forces an infeasible solution with respect to the thermal line limit
constraints. When this happens, proxy generators clear to supply energy at an arbitrarily high
price so that the market solves (the feasible region is never empty), while the agents receive $0
profits for the round. 25
3.3.4.1. Agent Value Set
The value function, in the fashion of Q-Learning, is Q(a): A → R. Q(a) holds a scalar
value for each action, which in the limit will approach the expected value of that action 26 , where
convergence occurs. In our model, Q(a) for every a is set to a high initial positive value, to
encourage exploration (this implies an optimistic estimate of expected values for actions, by
which agents are purposefully “disappointed” with actions they try and will continue to take
actions they haven’t tried until overall values fall into line with experience).

25

Strictly speaking, the LP described in the preceding section omits this proxy-unit feature. This discrepancy is
analogous to real-world system operations, in which an infeasible dispatch solution will be disregarded by system
operators, and the dispatch will be rerun with new inputs (as in Eastern RTOs), or the violating constraint will be
relaxed with a penalty (as in California).
26
As mentioned previously, Bertsekas and Tsitsiklis 1996 and Sutton and Barto, 1998 have shown that an action’s
value in a stationary task will converge in the limit to the true expected value to the agent of taking that action.
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In the reinforcement learning literature, there are two basic ways in which agents use
their action-values to select actions: soft-max or epsilon-greedy 27 . In the first case, soft-max, the
agent selects one combination of their portfolio of plants in or out of service (each combination
corresponding to one of their 32 actions) by sampling from an action-probability distribution,
derived from their action-values. The probability of selecting any action a is:
P(a) =

eQ(a) /τ

(x)

∑b=1 e Q (b) /τ
32

where τ is a so-called “temperature” parameter (used in reinforcement learning).

∑a=1 P(a) =
32

∑

32
a =1

eQ(a) /τ

∑b=1 e Q (b) /τ
32

=1

Obviously, regardless of τ, the probabilities sum to 1. In reinforcement learning
applications, in order for the theoretical optimality to be achieved, τ is adjusted downward by a
scaling factor less than 1 throughout the simulation to gradually shift action selection from
exploration (high τ implies a flatter action-probability distribution) to exploitation (a low τ
implies a peakier distribution). 28
The second way agents may pick actions is the epsilon-greedy method: Simpler than
soft-max, agents select their highest-valued action with probability 0.9 and sample from a
uniform distribution of their actions with probability 0.1. The method used here is epsilongreedy. In addition to requiring less computation, performance was better (agents discovered
more profitable stable equilibria more often) with epsilon-greedy.

27

The method used in Somani and Tesfatsion, 2008, is a special case of soft-max, with τ = 1.
In the stationary task case, according to Sutton and Barto 1998, optimality is guaranteed when certain criteria are
met, one of which is that the temperature must be reduced properly to ensure that the optimal action is always
chosen when the Q-function asymptotically approaches the true expected values of the actions.
28
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Because the joint reward function is deterministic, the task resembles a matrix game,
though the number of possible combinations of the five agents’ actions exceeds 33.5 million ( =
325). After the market clears, the agents are returned the cleared results of their portfolio, which
plants cleared and what prices were paid. The agents then calculate their reward as a function of
the total profit (a scalar multiplier in our case profit / 1000000; this has no practical impact
except to avoid a chance of a computational error when the soft-max action-selection method
was used with very small τ; we initially tried this, but eventually went with epsilon-greedy).
Having just taken action a, and calculated a reward r from their profit, the individual agent’s
update algorithm is:
Q (a ) ← (1 − α )Q ( a ) + αr

(ix)

This update algorithm has been widely used in agent-based models of electricity markets,
since it was popularized by Erev and Roth (1998), in their comparison of reinforcement learners
with human learners in experimental games. As agent-based models incorporate additional
features that have the effect of complicating the models and facing modelers with the potential
for non-convergence, other reinforcement learning algorithms (such as Abdallah and Lesser’s
weighted-policy learning) should be explored, as convergence of a community of agents to one
or several Nash-Equilibria has been demonstrated in certain contexts when convergence has
failed with the Q-learning update algorithm above.
3.4. Implementing the Model in Java
The model described above was implemented as a stand-alone Java application built
within the Eclipse Integrated Development Environment (IDE)29 . In addition to standard Java

29

See http://www.eclipse.org/ for more information.
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packages, we also used an open-source mathematical programming package (LP Solve) for
optimization. 30 The graphical user interface (GUI) is shown in Figure Figure 6.
The application has two primary functions. First, “Run Scenario Round” allows the
modeler to clear a single round of the market with manual inputs (setting not only the overall
parameters: loads, line limits, unit capacities, unit locations and marginal costs, but also agents’
bids). This feature is useful for constructing scenarios in preparation for a simulation run.
The second feature is to run a simulation using inputs. In this case, all the parameters
except the “Agent Offer Schedules” are used in the simulation (the agent offers are determined
by the agents, as described above; changing these values in the interface does not alter the ability
of each agent to offer their full portfolio).
In the present model version, the system topology and the numbers of agents and units
(also called plants or generators), are hard-coded. Adding the flexibility of inputting these
parameters was considered but was discarded because the marginal benefit to the research
project was deemed less than the added cost of changing the model. Future steps in this line of
research could include adding this feature. In fact, to make this research more applicable to realworld power systems, expanding the number of nodes, lines and agents will be critical. A key
component will be to incorporate dynamic calculation of shift factors from an easy systemtopology GUI design tool.
During simulation runs, data are saved to csv files in the default working directory (the
target working directory can be changed through editing the Java code). Analysis was performed
with the help of a second open-source program called R. 31
30

LP Solve was chosen because it is an established package of optimization tools with encouraging performance
(many 100,000s of rounds are practical on a standard laptop or desktop personal computer). For more information,
see http://lpsolve.sourceforge.net/5.5/.
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CHAPTER 4
EXPLORING THE MODEL
Early research results presented in Miksis, 2006, showed that adaptive agents in a
stationary electric power market model task successfully discovered optimal behavior. The
challenges to achieving convergence in a more complex and multi-agent reinforcement learning
application are significant, and as others have shown, convergence is not guaranteed, even in
relatively simple matrix games (Abdallah and Lesser, 2008).
Although many of the most interesting aspects of the market model are seen through the
simulation feature, the single round mode of the model supports intuition development as well as
sensitivity analysis after simulation results are gathered.
Figure 6 shows the market model interface that is used for both modes. There are 8
windows for simulation inputs and one control panel. Clockwise from top left are: 1) the control
panel, 2) the offer schedules for each of the 25 power plants (used only for the single-round
mode), 3) the node locations of each of the 25 plants, 4) the thermal limits on each of the 6
transmission lines, 5) the nodal (demand) loads, 6) the marginal costs for each of the 25 plants,
7) the capacities of each plant (defaulted to 500) and finally, 8) inputs controlling the simulation.
The simulation inputs are the number of rounds to run, the learning rate for the agents,
and the frequency with which the model should output market results to the set of csv files and
the frequency with which information should be printed to the Java console (helpful for
debugging). Using the single-round mode, it is possible to develop an intuitive understanding of
how the model clears the market.

31

See http://www.r-project.org/.
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Figure 6. Market Model Interface

CHAPTER 5
USING THE MODEL
As described in the introduction, this research was motivated by 3 fundamental questions:
1. Can a community of adaptive agents competing in a quantity-based market
model achieve equilibrium under various initial conditions?
2. Can players with plants at multiple locations (on either side of a transmission
constraint) discover withholding policies that cause congestion, essentially
raising prices at the import-constrained node?
3. Does the market as a whole supply surplus capacity above load or is the
average excess capacity margin in equilibrium close to zero?
In order to answer these questions, we first developed a set of 3 scenarios with various
distributions of plants across the system and recorded how the market cleared an “all-in”
situation, in which no units are withheld. For each scenario, we then ran several simulations
with the agents competing and learning. These scenarios well-represent two issues of concern in
modern competitive power systems: The exercise of system and local market power. The first
issue relates to firms’ ability to unilaterally or collectively withhold some capacity such that
prices are maintained above a level consistent with a competitive market. Several system
operators in the U.S. implement market power tests at the system level which allows mitigation
actions to be taken if one or a group of firms are pivotal (demand cannot be met without at least
some of their energy).
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The second issue, local market power, is the ability to affect prices in a local area caused
by network transmission constraints. System operators also have mechanisms in place to test for
and mitigate market power exercised at the local level. The agents in our model are motivated to
find profit-maximizing strategies by any means possible. We demonstrate that when highest
profits are achieved by withholding capacity and raising the system clearing price to$600, the
agents converge to this point. In the case where the most profitable joint-strategy is to
strategically withhold particular units at particular locations to take advantage of network
constraints, the agents successfully find this as well. In order for agents to converge to a jointstrategy that takes advantage of network constraints, they must have both the means to cause
congestion and the incentive to benefit from this action. If either element is missing, strategic
congestion will not result. Scenario 1 has both elements, and so we see higher prices result.
Scenarios 2 and 3 are structured such that overall capacity is withheld to raise system price, but
there is no congestion.
The data appendix contains market clearing output for all of these scenarios in both the
all-bid-in case and the strategic competition case. Scenarios are generically defined by thermal
line limits, nodal loads, plant capacities, plant marginal costs and plant-to-node assignments. All
scenarios use the line thermal limits and nodal loads as shown in Table 3, as well as the default
capacity and marginal costs parameters described earlier.
These values were chosen to represent a power grid with defined import-constrained and
export-constrained regions: Those with higher nodal demands represent load centers, such as
large metropolitan areas (Boston is a good example in the New England power system), which
generally also have higher generation costs and limited import capability, relative to demand;
Those nodes with lower loads represent more rural regions where generation costs are lower and
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the limitation is transmission capacity sufficient to export the energy that can potentially be
generated at that node (Maine in the New England power system is an example).

Figure 7. System Diagram Showing Line Limits and Loads

The scenarios explored below differ in the distribution of plants to nodes. While the
potential avenues of experimentation with the model developed here are numerous, only a subset
was chosen for practical reasons. These were chosen for their ability to showcase strategic
behavior.
5.1. Scenario 1
In the first scenario, the plants are distributed such that each agent has one plant at each
node, and the most expensive units are located in the higher-load areas. All agents have identical
distributions of their plants among the nodes, with all $600/MW plants at Node 0, $150/MW
plants at Node 1, etc. Appendix B Table 4 to Table 7 show market-cleared results in the case
when all units are bid in (no units are out of service). The baseline least-cost dispatch in this
case has congestion, because Line 3 (Node 1 to Node 2) is congested. Consequently, as the data
tables show, Agent 0’s Plant 1 is marginal and partially dispatched at the reference node at $80,
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while Agent 3’s Plant 3 is marginal and partially dispatched at Node 1 at $150. Prices at the
other nodes are determined as explained above, by the system energy component ($80 =
marginal generation unit cost at the reference node, Node 2) + shift factors * the shadow price on
the binding transmission line (Line 3).
Scenario 1 was then simulated with the agents competing to meet load. This scenario
attempts to answer Questions 1 and 2, whether equilibrium is reached, and whether agents
strategically bid to take advantage of transmission constraints. Simulations show that the agents
successfully achieve one of 20 (symmetrical) equilibrium joint policies in Scenario 1, involving a
permutation of the offer schedules shown in Table 8.
Because the agent’s plant distributions are identical, any of the permutations are equally
likely (which permutation is achieved depends on the randomly-determined path of experiences
and learning of the agents). As the table shows, only 4 of the 25 units are withheld, but profits
are substantial. Figure 8 shows time series of a single 100,000 round simulation (the series
represent averages of 100 rounds, so as to eliminate noise), in which rounds 45,000 and higher
showcase the equilibrium profit-maximizing case shown in Table 8.
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Figure 8. Scenario 1, Nodal LMPs for a Single Simulation Run

In the all-in market run, the highest LMP is $150.00 at Node 1, one of the two nodes with
relatively high load, and relatively expensive generation. Table 10 shows the prices resulting
from [any permutation of] the offer schedule shown above in Table 8. 32
The highest nodal price is at the reference node (note that marginal congestion
components can be negative, even though congestion itself always increases total costs), at
$1,955.79. A detailed derivation of this phenomenon is explained in Appendix A.

32

Table 9 to Table 12 show market output data for the one of the symmetrical permutations of
the agents’ equilibrium joint strategies.
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The agents converge to a permutation of this equilibrium joint strategy because it is the
strategy that maximizes total agent profit and it is a Nash-Equilibrium. No agent can unilaterally
increase its profits by deviating (while three agents are making less profit than the best-off and
second-best-off agents, they make even less if they break the stable joint strategy; which agents
end up in which role is random). It should be noted that convergence was not achieved within
100,000 rounds in every simulation.
Figure 9 shows price results from 3 simulation runs of the model with the parameter set
we have called “Scenario 1”. Clearly, after about 15,000 to 20,000 rounds, the agent’s have
begun to assign significantly different values to their actions, demonstrated by the reduction in
noise in the prices. It is clear that there are generally two regimes the agents converge to, and a
regime switch occurs at some point in each simulation.
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Figure 9. Scenario 1, Load-Weighted System LMP for Three Simulation Runs

It is notable that convergence occurs at different points in the simulation in each run. In
some other runs of the model (not shown), we observed that convergence did not occur at all in
100,000 rounds. This indicates that there may be a non-zero probably of regime switching to the
higher pricing and profit state never occurring.
By looking at the bid behavior over time, we can gain insights as well into whether the
agents tend to offer capacity close to load levels (excess capacity ~= 0), near full capacity
(12,500) or somewhere in between. We see in Figure 10 that dynamic adjustments in market
supply occur throughout the simulation, even while overall prices remain high. The series shows
both average aggregate supply over all rounds and only those which cleared competitively. This
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highlights how, after the initial learning phase, the agents proceed to rarely bid such that the
market doesn’t clear (the case when a proxy generator is dispatched and revenues are $0 for all
agents). Note that the chance of submitting a random offer (as opposed to the action with the
highest expected value) remains 10%, and so the “Approved Rounds” series of aggregate MW
supply offers is below 10,500 (the result of optimal behavior, with 4 units out of service of 500
MW each.

Figure 10. Scenario 1, Aggregate Supply Offered
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Figure 11 shows the individual agents’ profits over time, demonstrating that even after
overall high prices have been achieved there remains some jostling among the agents for their
piece of the profits.

Figure 11. Scenario 1, Individual Agents’ Profits over the Simulation Run

5.2. Scenario 2
In the next scenario we explored distributed the agents’ plants non-identically among the
nodes, in which all of each agent’s plants were at a single node (Agent 0 at Node 0, etc.). The
results of the single-round all-bid-in market clearing are shown in Table 13 to Table 16. In this
scenario, the all-bid-in least-cost dispatch does not have any congestion, and prices at all nodes
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are equal to the energy component (also shadow price of the energy balance equation, or the
marginal price of the marginal unit) of $150. Figure 12 shows the nodal prices over the
simulation run of Scenario 2. The competitive equilibrium market results can be found in the
appendix (Appendix B, Table 17 to Table 21).

Figure 12. Scenario 2, Nodal LMPs for a Single Simulation Run

We do not see the same pattern of congestion causing price separation in the equilibrium
solution for Scenario 2. However, due to selective withholding, the agents do maintain a price
point at $600/MW, compared with $150/MW in the all-bid-in case. Figure 13, below, shows
aggregate supply, graphed with total load and system capacity. We see that, in answer to
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Question 3, the agents withhold enough capacity to hold prices above the baseline least-cost allbid-in case.

Figure 13. Scenario 2, Aggregate Supply Offered

5.3. Scenario 3
The third scenario we examined was the inverse of Scenario 1. In this case, each agent
had a single plant at each node, except the distributions were in the reverse order ($600/MW at
Node 4, $150/MW at Node 3, etc.). The key result here was that, while all-bid-in least-cost
dispatch resulted in congestion, the equilibrium competitive solution did not (See Table 22 and
Table 27). As in Scenario 2, the agents successfully withheld capacity to maintain an average
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system price of $600/MW, but this was not more profitable than a solution involving
strategically-caused congestion.

Figure 14. Scenario 3, Nodal LMPs for a Single Simulation Run
Similarly to the simulation run of Scenarios 1 and 2, we see a switch in aggregate supply
offered somewhere between rounds 85,000 and 90,000, though prices do not change.
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Figure 15. Scenario 3, Aggregate Supply Offered

5.4. Using The Model – Conclusion
In all 3 of the scenarios we ran, the 5 agents established baseline price outcomes
significantly higher than the “all-bid-in” competitive solution. In one scenario, the agents
utilized the system topology and distribution of generating units among the nodes to maintain a
load-weighted system average price significantly above even the highest price offer: Absent the
continued exploration caused by the epsilon value, which caused deviations from the learned
greedy behavior, every round after learning converged in Scenario 1 would have had prices as
shown in Table 10 (a weighted system price of $974.49, 62% higher than the highest unit costs).
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION AND WHAT’S NEXT
In the last two decades, many examples of agent-based models of competitive electric
power markets have been developed, varying along several dimensions, including sophistication
of the agents, complexity of the underlying transmission system and incorporation of features
unique to modern electric power systems. As with many new ventures in a young field, there
remain significant trade-offs that must be made, explicitly or not, between complexity/realism
and practicability. Simple agents in a complex environment may not behave as agents in an
analogous real-world situation would, which can lead to results that, while interesting, do not
carry the gravity of results with optimality proofs, or those with strong evidence of convergence
to equilibria that can be favorably benchmarked against real-world phenomena. This carries the
risk that interesting conclusions are not as compelling as they could be. On the other hand,
sophisticated agents with learning capabilities may not fully learn a task with multiple
dimensions in terms of interacting products (gas and electricity, electricity and ancillary services,
etc.), overlapping and nested time periods (multi-year contracting, day-ahead and spot
balancing), or a large number of assets with granular action sets, in which case convergence may
not occur.
Several researchers in the field have commented that agent-based models suffer from
insufficient robustness necessary for the ABM approach to gain wider acceptance, particularly
among economists and regulators. Part of the motivation for this research was to incrementally
build a model with enough realism to demonstrate phenomena that are in fact of great concern to
stakeholders in the electric power industry (market power in transmission systems with
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congestion). We have succeeded in doing this, demonstrating, although without rigorous parallel
analytical solutions (like Waltman and Kaymak, 2008, have), that profit-seeking agents both 1)
quickly find and favor feasible solutions and 2) often converge in a relatively small number of
rounds to profit-maximizing equilibria. In all 3 of the scenarios we ran, the 5 agents established
baseline price outcomes significantly higher than the “all-bid-in” competitive solution. In one
scenario, the agents utilized the system topology and distribution of generating units among the
nodes to maintain a load-weighted system average price significantly above even the highest
price offer (a load-weighted system price of $974.49, 62% higher than the most expensive units’
costs).
In the work presented in this thesis, we have attempted to answer the three questions
posed in the introduction:
1. Can a community of adaptive agents competing in a quantity-based market model
achieve equilibrium under various initial conditions?
2. Can players with plants at multiple locations (on either side of a transmission
constraint) discover withholding policies that cause congestion, essentially raising
prices at the import-constrained node?
3. Does the market as a whole supply surplus capacity above load or is the average
excess capacity margin in equilibrium close to zero?
We can answer the first two affirmatively, under the conditions presented in each of the
scenarios (with the caveat that the 2nd and 3rd scenarios did not have the underlying generating
plant distribution among the nodes in which an equilibrium solution with congestion was the
most profitable outcome). The third question is actually not very significant in the scenarios
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presented in this work, as the agents clearly had little incentive to withhold capacity down to the
level of load once the system energy price reached the maximum attainable in the uncongested
case. For the congested case, clearly aggregate supply is not the deciding factor in profitability,
but it is the interplay between localized capacity and transmission constraints.
Future steps in this line of research must include consideration of how to incorporate
environments with increased complexity while appreciating the limitations of learning agents.
Additional surveys of contemporary multi-agent reinforcement learning literature may lead
toward insights on how to move beyond the limitations presently identified of more complexity
and less tractability vs. less complexity and more tractability. Neural networks and other general
function approximation techniques may support sufficient learning speeds in high-dimensional
tasks where generalization is necessary.
Immediate steps to proceed from the current state of the research presented here will
include enhancing the model to support dynamic system topology creation through a GUI or
input files in order to explore more realistic transmission congestion scenarios, and more robust
experimentation to explore the distribution of rounds-to-convergence among larger numbers of
identical scenario runs with different pseudo-random number seeds. Introducing demand-side
bidding and a multi-settlement system may be possible to the extent that the costs in terms of
added joint-action space are made explicit and convergence remains achievable; here more than
anywhere else, what we don’t yet know of contemporary multi-agent systems research may be a
silver bullet of sorts in surmounting the trade-off highlighted above.
The potential for research in the direction begun in this thesis is both academically
engaging and practical for applications to real-world concerns. Flexible, scalable, customizable
models of market interactions support ultimate what-if scenario analysis. Combined with an
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underlying transmission model and generation portfolio with sufficient realism, the models have
the potential to be run parallel to transmission planning studies, structural market power
estimates, and market rule-making to stress-test scenarios before real-world implementation.
Regulators and other stakeholders have repeatedly expressed concern about the potential exercise
of market power in competitive electricity markets, particularly in regions where transmission
bottlenecks are prone to creating extreme market power where there are only a few independent
suppliers available to meet demand in extreme circumstances. However, rules written to test for,
catch and punish anticompetitive behavior, such as strategic withholding, are complex and
imperfect. The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission has determined to ensure just and
reasonable electric rates through design and implementation of competitive generation markets
and open-access transmission systems coupled with careful regulations tailored to the uniqueness
of electric power markets. Using all available research tools to examine market outcomes where
agents seek to exploit profitable market weaknesses without regard to regulatory repercussions
can offer an added layer of protection to market monitoring and mitigation procedures of system
operators, particularly in light of the complex pricing effects strategic behavior can have on an
interconnected power grid.
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APPENDIX A
EXPOSITION OF NODAL PRICES

Figure 16. Scenario 1 Equilibrium Joint Strategy, Power Line Flows % of Capacity

1. Line 4, running from Node 2 to Node 3, is congested in the direction of the
reference Node (2). Consequently, in order to deliver a single MW to Node 2, we
need to find a combination of redispatches that will not increase flow on this line.
2. Note that the GSF of every non-reference node to Line 4 is negative, meaning
unilaterally increasing generation anywhere will exacerbate the problem (violate
the constraint).
Table 1. Generator Shift Factors (Nodes in Rows, Lines in Columns)
0
1
3
4

0
0.54
-0.13
0.35
0.51

1
0.25
0.07
-0.19
0.17

2
0.21
0.06
-0.16
-0.68

3
0.54
0.87
0.35
0.51
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4
-0.46
-0.13
-0.65
-0.49

5
-0.21
-0.06
0.16
-0.32

3. To solve this problem, we need to increase generation by a net of 1 MW at two
nodes by increasing output at one of them by 1 more than we decrease output at
another. 33 However, there is another limitation. The node at which we increase
generation must have a smaller (absolute) shift factor with Line 4 than the one
where we decrease generation.
4. The candidates for increasing generation are a plant at Node 3 or a plant at Node 0
(notice that those plants in service at the other nodes have all been dispatched to
their maximum capacity).
5. Because the GSF for Node 0 and Line 4 (-0.46) is absolutely smaller than the GSF
for Node 3 and Line 4 (-0.65), we will increase output at Node 0 and decrease it at
Node 4.
6. Consider that meeting the incremental MW at Node 2 from Node 0 will cause
Line 4 to go 0.46 MW over its limit. Therefore, we need to further increase output
at Node 1 and balance it will a decrease in output at Node 3. But by how much?
7. The effect of replacing a single MW at Node 3 with one from Node 0 has the net
effect of decreasing flow in the offending direction on Line 4 by 0.19 MW (-0.46
- -0.65 = 0.19).

33

PowerWorld is a software package that is extremely useful for generating intuition of power flows. See
http://www.powerworld.com/ for more information.
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8. Additionally, the marginal change in the objective function of this single MW
substitution is $560 ($600 cost at Node 0 - $40 saved at Node 3). Therefore, we
need to incur $560 / 0.19 to decrease flow on Line 4 by a full 1 MW.
9. However, we don’t need a full MW, we only need 0.46 MW. 0.46 * $560 / 0.19
= $1355.79. This equals the price difference between the source of that
incremental MW (Node 0) and the reference node (Node 2)! 34

34

It is important to remember that the choice of a reference node will not change LMPs, but it will change
congestion components and loss components in AC systems. Therefore, in an energy-only power system, the
reference node is arbitrary, but when financial settlements are made based on components of LMP (in AC systems,
congestion and losses), the choice is not longer arbitrary. See Litvinov, et al, 2004.
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APPENDIX B
DATA
Table 2. Transmission System Data
Node to Reference
Line

Resistance

0
1
2
3
4
5

0.0281
0.0304
0.0064
0.0108
0.0297
0.0297

0Æ2

1Æ2

3Æ2

4Æ2

54%
25%
21%
54%
-46%
-21%

-13%
7%
6%
87%
-13%
-6%

35%
-19%
-16%
35%
-65%
16%

51%
17%
-68%
51%
-49%
-32%

Line Flow %
(Generator Shift
Factors)
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Table 3. Defaults Scenarios’ Power System Parameters
Line
0
1
2
3
4
5

Limit
1,500
1,500
2,500
1,000
500
1,000

Node
0
1
2
3
4

Load
3,500
2,500
1,000
1,000
500

Table 4. Scenario 1 Cleared All-Bid-In, Portfolio Results
Agent
0
1
2
3
4

Plant 0
MW Price
500
$121.03
500
$121.03
500
$121.03
500
$121.03
500
$121.03

M
0
0
0
0
0

Plant 1
MW Price
500
$108.16
500
$108.16
500
$108.16
500
$108.16
500
$108.16

M
0
0
0
0
0

Plant 2
MW
252.9
500
0
500
500

Price
$80
$80
$80
$80
$80

M
1
1
0
1
1

Plant 3
MW
500
500
500
247.1
0

Price
$150
$150
$150
$150
$150

M
1
0
1
1
0

Table 5. Scenario 1 Cleared All-Bid-In, Nodal Prices
LMPs
Node
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0
1
2
3
4

Energy
$80
$80
$80
$80
$80

Congestion
$43.45
$70
$0
$28.16
$41.03

Price
$123.45
$150
$80
$108.16
$121.03

Table 6. Scenario 1 Cleared All-Bid-In, Transmission Line Flows
Line Flows
Line
0
1
2
3
4
5

MW Flow
-247.1
-872.7
-2380.2
-1000
-247.1
380.2

Capacity (+/-)
1500
1500
2500
1000
500
1000

Plant 4
MW Price
0
$123.45
0
$123.45
0
$123.45
0
$123.45
0
$123.45

M
0
0
0
0
0

Table 7. Scenario 1 Cleared All-Bid-In, Nodal MWs
Nodal Net Loads
Node

Total Generation
0
1
2
3
4

Competitive Generation

0
1747.1
1752.9
2500
2500

0
1747.1
1752.9
2500
2500

Load
3500
2500
1000
1000
500

Net Import
-3500
-752.9
752.9
1500
2000

Table 8. Scenario 1, Cleared Equilibrium Joint Strategy, Agent Quantity Offers
Agent
0
1
2
3
4

Plant 0
500
500
500
500
500

Plant 1
500
500
500
500
500

Plant 2
0
0
500
0
500

Plant 3
500
500
0
500
500

Plant 4
500
500
500
500
500
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Table 9. Scenario 1, Cleared Equilibrium Joint Strategy, Portfolio Results
Agent
0
1
2
3
4

Plant 0
MW
Price
500
$511.58
500
$511.58
500
$511.58
500
$511.58
500
$511.58

M
0
0
0
0
0

Plant 1
MW
500
500
447.4
500
500

Price
$40
$40
$40
$40
$40

M
1
0
1
1
1

Plant 2
MW
0
0
500
0
500

Price
$1,955.79
$1,955.79
$1,955.79
$1,955.79
$1,955.79

M
0
0
0
0
0

Plant 3
MW
500
500
0
500
500

Price
$1,572.63
$1,572.63
$1,572.63
$1,572.63
$1,572.63

M
0
0
0
0
0

Plant 4
MW
52.6
500
0
0
0

Price
$600
$600
$600
$600
$600

M
1
0
0
0
0

Table 10. Scenario 1 Cleared Equilibrium Joint Strategy, Nodal Prices
LMPs
Node
0
1
2
3
4

Energy
$1,955.79
$1,955.79
$1,955.79
$1,955.79
$1,955.79

Congestion
($1,355.79)
($383.16)
$0.00
($1,915.79)
($1,444.21)

Price
$600.00
$1,572.63
$1,955.79
$40.00
$511.58

Table 11. Scenario 1, Cleared Equilibrium Joint Strategy, Transmission Line Flows
Line Flows
Line

MW Flow
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0
1
2
3
4
5

0
-706.8
-2240.5
-500
-500
240.5

Capacity (+/-)
1500
1500
2500
1000
500
1000

Table 12. Scenario 1, Cleared Equilibrium Joint Strategy, Nodal MWs
Nodal Net Loads
Node
0
1
2
3
4

Total Generation
552.6
2000
1000
2447.4
2500

Competitive Generation
552.6
2000
1000
2447.4
2500

Load
3500
2500
1000
1000
500

Net Import
-2947.4
-500
0
1447.4
2000

Table 13. Scenario 2, Cleared All-Bid-In, Portfolio Results
Agent
0
1
2
3
4

Plant 0
MW
Price
500
$150.00
500
$150.00
500
$150.00
500
$150.00
500
$150.00

M
0
0
0
0
0

Plant 1
MW
Price
500
$150.00
500
$150.00
500
$150.00
500
$150.00
500
$150.00

M
0
0
0
0
0

Plant 2
MW
Price
500
$150.00
500
$150.00
500
$150.00
500
$150.00
500
$150.00

M
0
0
0
0
0

Plant 3
MW
Price
0
$150.00
11.5
$150.00
488.5
$150.00
0
$150.00
500
$150.00

M
0
1
1
0
0

Table 14. Scenario 2, Cleared All-Bid-In, Nodal Prices
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Node
0
1
2
3
4

Energy
$150.00
$150.00
$150.00
$150.00
$150.00

Congestion
$0.00
$0.00
$0.00
$0.00
$0.00

Price
$150.00
$150.00
$150.00
$150.00
$150.00

Table 15. Scenario 2, Cleared All-Bid-In, Transmission Line Flows
Line
0
1
2
3
4
5

MW Flow
-11.5
-409.2
-1579.3
-1000
-11.5
79.3

Capacity (+/-)
1500
1500
2500
1000
500
1000

Plant 4
MW
Price
0
$150.00
0
$150.00
0
$150.00
0
$150.00
0
$150.00

M
0
0
0
0
0

Table 16. Scenario 2, Cleared All-Bid-In, Nodal MWs
Node
0
1
2
3
4

Total Generation
1500
1511.5
1988.5
1500
2000

Competitive Generation
1500
1511.5
1988.5
1500
2000

Load
3500
2500
1000
1000
500

Net Import
-2000
-988.5
988.5
500
1500

Table 17. Scenario 2, Cleared Equilibrium Joint Strategy, Agent Quantity Offers
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Agent
0
1
2
3
4

Plant 0
500
500
500
500
500

Plant 1
500
500
500
500
500

Plant 2
500
500
500
500
500

Plant 3
0
0
0
0
500

Plant 4
500
500
500
500
0

Table 18. Scenario 2, Cleared Equilibrium Joint Strategy, Portfolio Results
Agent
0
1
2
3
4

Plant 0
MW
Price
500
$600.00
500
$600.00
500
$600.00
500
$600.00
500
$600.00

M
0
0
0
0
0

Plant 1
MW
Price
500
$600.00
500
$600.00
500
$600.00
500
$600.00
500
$600.00

M
0
0
0
0
0

Plant 2
MW
Price
500
$600.00
500
$600.00
500
$600.00
500
$600.00
500
$600.00

M
0
0
0
0
0

Plant 3
MW
Price
0
$600.00
0
$600.00
0
$600.00
0
$600.00
500
$600.00

M
0
0
0
0
0

Plant 4
MW
Price
0
$600.00
500
$600.00
0
$600.00
0
$600.00
0
$600.00

M
0
1
0
0
0

Table 19. Scenario 2, Cleared Equilibrium Joint Strategy, Nodal Prices
Node
0
1
2
3
4

Energy
$600.00
$600.00
$600.00
$600.00
$600.00

Congestion
$0.00
$0.00
$0.00
$0.00
$0.00

Price
$600.00
$600.00
$600.00
$600.00
$600.00

Table 20. Scenario 2, Cleared Equilibrium Joint Strategy, Transmission Line Flows
Line
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0
1
2
3
4
5

MW Flow
-75
-375
-1550
-575
-75
50

Capacity (+/-)
1500
1500
2500
1000
500
1000

Table 21. Scenario 2, Cleared Equilibrium Joint Strategy, Nodal MWs
Node
0
1
2
3
4

Total Generation
1500
2000
1500
1500
2000

Competitive Generation
1500
2000
1500
1500
2000

Load
3500
2500
1000
1000
500

Net Import
-2000
-500
500
500
1500

Table 22. Scenario 3, Cleared All-Bid-In, Portfolio Results
Agent
0
1
2
3
4

MW
500
500
500
500
500

Price
$129.54
$129.54
$129.54
$129.54
$129.54

M
0
0
0
0
0

MW
500
500
500
500
500

Price
$94.00
$94.00
$94.00
$94.00
$94.00

M
0
0
0
0
0

MW
500
500
500
500
184.6

Price
$80.00
$80.00
$80.00
$80.00
$80.00

M
0
0
0
0
1

MW
315.4
500
0
500
0

Price
$150.00
$150.00
$150.00
$150.00
$150.00

M
1
0
0
0
0

MW

Table 23. Scenario 3, Cleared All-Bid-In, Nodal Prices
Node
0
1
2
3
4

Energy
$80.00
$80.00
$80.00
$80.00
$80.00

Congestion
$49.54
$14.00
$0.00
$70.00
$52.77

Price
$129.54
$94.00
$80.00
$150.00
$132.77
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Table 24. Scenario 3, Cleared All-Bid-In, Transmission Line Flows
Line
0
1
2
3
4
5

MW Flow
-684.6
-394.9
79.5
-684.6
500
420.5

Capacity (+/-)
1500
1500
2500
1000
500
1000

0
0
0
0
0

Price
$132.77
$132.77
$132.77
$132.77
$132.77

M
0
0
0
0
0

Table 25. Scenario 3, Cleared All-Bid-In, Nodal MWs
Node
0
1
2
3
4

Total Generation
2500
2500
2184.6
1315.4
0

Competitive Generation
2500
2500
2184.6
1315.4
0

Load
3500
2500
1000
1000
500

Net Import
-1000
0
1184.6
315.4
-500

Table 26. Scenario 3, Cleared Equilibrium Joint Strategy, Agent Quantity Offers
Agent
0
1
2
3
4

Plant 0
500
500
500
500
500

Plant 1
500
500
500
500
500

Plant 2
0
500
0
500
500

Plant 3
500
0
500
0
500

Plant 4
500
500
500
500
500
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Table 27. Scenario 3, Cleared Equilibrium Joint Strategy, Portfolio Results
Agent
0
1
2
3
4

Plant 0
MW
Price
500
$600.00
500
$600.00
500
$600.00
500
$600.00
500
$600.00

M
0
0
0
0
0

Plant 1
MW
Price
500
$600.00
500
$600.00
500
$600.00
500
$600.00
500
$600.00

M
0
0
0
0
0

Plant 2
MW
Price
0
$600.00
500
$600.00
0
$600.00
500
$600.00
500
$600.00

M
0
0
0
0
0

Plant 3
MW
Price
500
$600.00
0
$600.00
500
$600.00
0
$600.00
500
$600.00

M
0
0
0
0
0

Plant 4
MW
Price
0
$600.00
500
$600.00
0
$600.00
0
$600.00
0
$600.00

M
0
1
0
0
0

Table 28. Scenario 3, Cleared Equilibrium Joint Strategy, Nodal Prices
Node
0
1
2
3
4

Energy
$600.00
$600.00
$600.00
$600.00
$600.00

Congestion
$0.00
$0.00
$0.00
$0.00
$0.00

Price
$600.00
$600.00
$600.00
$600.00
$600.00

Table 29. Scenario 3, Cleared Equilibrium Joint Strategy, Transmission Line Flows
Line
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0
1
2
3
4
5

MW Flow
-365.0
-345.0
-290.0
-365.0
135
290.0

Capacity (+/-)
1500
1500
2500
1000
500
1000

Table 30. Scenario 3, Cleared Equilibrium Joint Strategy, Nodal MWs
Node
0
1
2
3
4

Total Generation
2,500
2,500
1,500
1,500
500

Competitive Generation
2,500
2,500
1,500
1,500
500

Load
3,500
2,500
1,000
1,000
500

Net Import
-1,000
0
500
500
0
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